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The Independence of Albania and the Albanian-Ottoman Relations  
1912-1913 
 
I.  The Role of the Albanians in the First Balkan War 
 
The problem of the Albanian role in the First Balkan War calls for refined researches. During 
the investigation it is unavoidable to separate the history of the soldiers who were on duty in 
the imperial army from the fact, that the civilian population did not put up armed resistance 
against the Serbian and Montenegrin Armies. The Albanian civilians, mostly Muslims, who 
had always been ready to spark off an uprising or a revolution against the Young Turk 
government, despite all contemporary expectations, did not intervene in the military 
operations in the autumn of 1912.  
 
Albanians in the imperial army 
 
Of the professionel nizam-units, which were garrisoned in Albanian territories, only few were 
composed of ethnic Albanian soldiers. These units, similar to the recruited redif-troops 
organised on territorial basis and composed exclusively by Albanians, had not taken part in 
regular and efficient trainings, military exercises and were not well armed with weapons and 
ammunition.  
As a consequence of the Albanian uprisings between 1910 and 1912 and countless 
desertations from the Ottoman army, the Albanian officers and soldiers were surrounded by 
obvious distrust among the imperial troops. To defend themselves and to force the changes of 
the general conditions the army were under, these officers began to organise secret groups in 
1912. One of these groups was „The League of Albanian officers”. The most important target 
of the league was to overthrow the Ottoman minister of war, Mahmud Şevket Pasha, who was 
held responsible  for all problems within the imperial army.
1
 Due to the similar ambitions of 
other secret military organisations, the minister resigned on 10th July of 1912. 
 The general mobilization, ordered by the Ottoman high command, was carried out in 
the administrative units populated mostly by Albanians between 23th September and 12th 
October of 1912. The Albanians of Kosovo vilaet however were unwilling to join to the redif-
troops of the army. They seemed willing to combat at the same time in the vilaet of Monastir, 
although not in the army but in irregular troops.
 2
 It was Esat Pasha Toptani, who managed to 
set up the local redif-troops in Middle-Albania. He mobilisied more than 10.000 men and led 
them to Shkodra. All in all, there must have been approximately 70.000 soldiers on duty in the 
imperial army in October of 1912 (both nizam- and redif-units). The number of irregular 
troops, composed by Albanians, is unknown.
3
 
 There is a lack of information about the contemporary role of the Albanians in the 
army.
4
 The ”thesis of the treason” (see below), formulated by the Young Turks and commited 
by Albanians, is based on the fact that Albanian soldiers continued to desert from the Ottoman 
divisions in the First Balkan War in mass. The archive sources of Austria-Hungary strongly 
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suggest, for instance, that Albanian soldiers, driven by unknown motives, deserted from their 
units during the battles of Kumanovo and Monastir in critical moments.
5
 It is however 
unimaginable that the Albanian soldiers of the imperial army, being stationed in their own 
home country, did not resist with all their might against the conquerors.
6
  
 One of the extant contemporary sources was written by a Turkish officer with 
Ottoman identity. Ahmad Hamdi was an artillery officer, who was fighting the First Balkan 
War in the XXI. division.
7
 In the last years before the war Hamdi had refused to engage in 
politics, he had judged everything from the point of view of the army. According to Hamdi 
the very reasons of the military defeat were the underdeveloped armament of the imperial 
army, the lack of trainings and manoeuvres and the collapse of the military moral. In his book 
the Turkish officer took the side of the Albanian officers and soldiers. He criticised the 
government policy of the Young Turks between 1908 and 1912, for instance the brutal 
disarming operations, and set out a number of examples to rebut the views about the Albanian 
cowardice.
8
 Against the Serbian army, equipped with modern artillery and arriving with well-
organised and trained and motivated soldiers, the imperial divisons, stated Hamdi, simply had 
had no chance. Of the 1500 soldiers of the Gjilan batallion only 15 men survived the battle of 
Kumanovo.  
 It follows from the foregoing that beside the imperial army the Albanian irregular 
troops proved to be unable to offer resistance, as well.
9
 Only the Albanian tribes of Luma 
could succesfully resist the Montengrin and Serbian units, because they fought in very 
advantageous geographical conditions.
10
 Isa Boletini and Bajram Curri, the most well-known 
commanders of the Kosovarian irregular troops, devoted all their efforts to save their men and 
to retreat towards the coast of Albania in a constant and bitter fight. They were to battle in all 
cities and fortress on their way from Kosovo to the Adria, but the fast invasion of the 
conquering armies, followed by a well-prepared plan of military operations, gave them no 
time to organise an effective resistance. It was Mitrovica where Boletini began to fight with 
Serbian units on the 18th October of 1912, but after a month his men were driven back to 
Vlora.
11
  
 
Albanian Civilians and the War 
 
The Young Turk political thinking reacted bitterly to the total military defeat in the First 
Balkan War and it developed the „thesis of the Albanian treason” in the late autumn of 1912. 
According to the thesis it was the Albanians, who were to hold responsible for the defeat in 
the Balkanian theatre of war.
12
 The Muslim civilians of the vilaets of Kosovo and Macedonia, 
who were always ready to revolt against the government of Istambul and to fight for the 
defense of their own ethnic territories earlier, reacted this time apparently with ignorance and 
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inactivity during the first weeks of the war. But why had they refused to be active in the 
battlefield? 
 The main reasons should be found in the goverment policy between 1908-1912, 
pursued by the Young Turk party against the Albanian population. The disarming operations 
of Torgut Şevket Pasha, as his army of 40-50.000 men had marched violently across the 
Albanian administrative units, had brought about serious consequences. It is not known 
whether he was able to disarm the Muslim and Catholic civilians of the vilaets of Monastir, 
Kosovo and Shkodra,
13
 but his operations resulted by all means in essential distrust against 
the imperial army. But not only the connections between the army and the civilians could be 
characterized by distrust. According to Marie Godin, a contemporary traveller in the Balkans, 
the North-Albanian population, also known as ’gegs’, sometimes simply refused to believe 
the news from Istambul. On the territory of Luma, for instance, the mobilization order of the 
Sultan was considered as a trap, set by the Young Turk party.
14
  
 At the beginning of the war, as the Serbian army marched into the vilaet of Kosovo 
with modern artillery and well-organised soldiers, the Albanian warriors, who had still lived 
in the world of the individual acts of heroism, would have been powerless by all means. In 
addition, just after occupying the country the Serbian high command ordered the weapons to 
be collected from the civilians and to expel the Muslims.
15
 The wavees of refugees, brought 
about by the ethnic cleansing policy and the military administration of the Serbian army, 
made the conditions of resistance even more difficult.
16
 
 There had been a contemporary feature of the Albanian mentality that must be taken 
into consideration as well. The single tribes, clans and families showed a lack of confidence in 
the every-day connections with each other. If evidence of resistance was given, each and 
every irregular troop defended its own local territory and it certainly hindered the idea of a 
common resistance even further. The lack of solidarity based on national feelings was 
obvious. The homeland was basically the village or the valley, eventually the administrative 
unit. Under the conditions of a modern warfare the infrastructually underdeveloped 
geographical environment proved to be a significant drawback as well.
17
 
 On the eve of the First Balkan War, Hasan Prishtina, Nexhip Draga, Bajram Curri and 
Mithat Frashëri, the leaders of the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, met in Skopje 
(Üsküb at that time) to set up the „Black Society for Saving” on the 14th October of 1912.18 
These politicians and commanders drafted a letter, addressed to the governments of the great 
powers. In the letter, the leader stressed, that the Albanians shall fight against the invadors; 
not for the Empire, however, but for saving their ethnic territories.
19
 Due to lack of time the 
society proved to be unable to prepare the civilians for the war. At the outbreak of the war the 
commanders moved to their native villages to take up arms against the Serbian troops, while 
the political leaders, Hasan Prishtina and Nexhip Draga, exactly in that critical moment, were 
arrested by the occupying army of Serbia. Prishtina and Draga could leave the prison of 
Belgrade only in May of 1913.
20
 
 
                                                 
13
 On the one hand the arsenals of Peja and Prizren were robbed by Albanian rebels in Summer of 1912. On the 
other hand it was the Ottoman leadership of the vilaet of Kosovo that distributed weapons among the Muslim 
civilians. ÖHHStA PA XXXVIII. Konsulate, Prizren, Kt. 405, report of Prochaska, Prizren, 27.08.1912, Nr.86. 
14
 Maria Amalie von GODIN, Aus dem neuen Albanien. Politische und historische Skizzen. Wien 1914, 12. 
15
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 414/5o, report of Ugron, Belgrad, 30.10.1912, Nr.122C. 
16
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 414/5o, report and telegram of Heimroth, Üsküb, 18.11.1912, Nr.126, 1-2. and 
20.12.1912, Nr.4486. 
17
 GODIN, Aus dem neuen Albanien, 12 and 14. 
18
 PRIFTI (ed.), Historia e Popullit II, 504. 
19
 BAJRAKTARI, Roli i Kosovës, 139. 
20
 Krisztián CSAPLÁR, Hasan Bej Prishtina, az első koszovói albán politikus, in: Tamás KRAUSZ (ed.), Kelet-
Európa: történelem és sorsközösség. Palotás Emil 70. születésnapjára. Budapest 2006, 80-82. 
 4 
The tribes of the North-Albanian Alps made no attempt to resist the Montenegrin invaders. 
Those tribes whose territories were located at the borders and those whose territories lied 
beside the main roads leading into the inner regions of the empire, were forced to support the 
marching troops of Montenegro. It can be stated, that the majority of the North-Albanian 
tribes had well assessed the consequences of the eventual resistance and while watching over 
their tribe-borders they waited for a better time to act.
21
 As a matter of fact, from the point of 
view of the war these tribes followed the events with neutrality.
22
 Nikita, king of Montenegro 
kept in touch with the leaders of the tribes during his campaign. He wanted to gain their trust 
with subventions and promises of tribal autonomy.
23
 
 In November of 1912, however, as there was no possibility for bigger number of 
hostile troops to march across the territories of the North-Albanian Alps, the chieftains 
ordered their warriors to launch attacks on reserves transports and smaller garrisons.
24
 
 
 
II.  The Independence Proclamation of Albania 
 
Hearing the war preparations of the Balkan Alliance at the end of September, one of the 
Albanian aristocrats, former member of parliament, Syrja Bej Vlora (1860-1940) made 
attempt to prevent the eventual dismemberment of his country. He convoked a national 
assembly to Vlora, where he expected delegates from the whole Albania. The delegates, 
however, without conviction, were only drifting in the port. While organising the assembly 
Syrja had many difficulties: the behaviour of the delegates could have been best characterised 
by their constant partiality, envy, narrow-mindedness and passivity. They proved to be unable 
to deliver decisions. It was simply impossible, for instance, to force the participants to agree 
with each other on the agenda. After starting off Syrja Vlora, as a chairman, gave an account 
of the general situation of the empire and Albania with regard to the summer events (Albanian 
uprising). According to him, the empire had fallen; the reforms promised by the government 
were uncertain: it was simply impossible to realize them. The alliance of the Balkan states did 
exist, added the Bej, and the Ottoman army shall not be able to save the integrity of the 
imperium, regarding its broken moral and the lack of inner solidarity. As long as it was 
possible, the Albanians were forced to make a decision how to rescue themselves ’from the 
sinking ship’.25 To solve the problems of their nation Syrja Vlora suggested to proclaim the 
independence and neutrality of the country. The audience however reacted to the exalted 
evaluation speech with derisive smile, sorry and critic.
26
 The delegates simply refused to 
believe the assumption that the Balkan Alliance would dare to launch an attack on the empire 
on its own initiatives. According to them in such a case the great powers would impede the 
dismemberment of the peninsula. The assembly proved to be unsuccesful. It was however not 
just the delegates who hindered the efficiency of the debates. The assembly was further 
hindered by the local adherents of Ismail Qemal Vlora, the relative and the most significant 
political opponent of Syrja, as well. 
 
Syrja Vlora was in port Vlora when the First Balkan War broke out. On hearing the first news 
from the battlefield he decided to travel to Middle- and North-Albania to hold direct 
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negotiations with the local nobles and to organise a new national assembly in one of the cities 
by the river Shkumbi.
27
  
 Via Durrës Syrja Bej arrived to Tirana in the first week of November. The aristocrat 
wanted the would-be delegates of the assembly, besides proclaiming the independence, to set 
up a delegation to represent their nation in a general conference that shall be devoted to 
solving the new problems of the peninsula, that had been posed by the war.
28
 The idea of a 
proclamation was welcomed by the majority of the Bej-families in Middle-Albania. Some 
members of the Great House of Toptani, the most significant landowner family in the region, 
however refused to advocate the aim of Syrja, similar to the tribes of Malissia (e.g. Mirdita) in 
the North as well.
29
 They must have counted with the resistance of the local Muslim 
population, that demonstrated his affection to the Sultan through countless protests.
30
 All in 
all, the hardships outlined above made it impossible to organise a national assembly in 
Middle-Albania. 
 After the failure in Middle-Albania Syrja Vlora travelled to Shkodra. He wanted 
Hasan Riza, the Arabian commander of the fortress city, and deputy commander Esat Toptani 
to raise the Albanian flag and proclaim the independence of Albania in case of an eventual 
military defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly enough Hasan Riza reacted to the 
suggestion with sympathy, while the Albanian Esat Pasha remained somewhat more reserved. 
After hearing the news that the Montenegrin and Serbian troops crossed the imperial borders, 
Esat accepted the idea of a national assembly. His answer reassured the Muslim population in 
Middle-Albania as well (Esat Toptani was the most significant landlord of that region).
31
 The 
war events however impeded the convocation of the assembly.  
 
The predictions of Syrja Vlora in September came true at the beginning of November. The 
allied forces invaded the imperial districts with an irresistible force and the imperial army was 
not able to prevent the occupation of the Albanian territories. The local nobles and 
intellectuals of Albania understood with astonishment that it was high time to deliver their 
decision as to how they imagined the future of their country: with or without the Ottoman 
Empire?
32
 
 In the territories threatened by the Greek divisions (Ioannina vilaet), the Albanian 
nobles organised many meetings. In these meetings they decided to support the imperial army 
to their best and they encouraged ’the geg north’ to do the same. The Albanian nobles of the 
vilaet Ioannina adressed a letter to the Albanian leaders of the Catholic Church in the vilaets 
of Shkodra, Kosovo and Monastir and to the cities populated mostly by Muslim Albanians. 
They announced the fact, that „each and every tosk Albanian” took up arms to save their 
homeland and nation. (It was not defined how they interpreted the concept of ’homeland’). 
All who refuse to join the imperial army, added the nobles, commit high treason. The 
secretary and one member of the Albanian national club of Ioannina visited the local Austro-
Hungarian consul at the same time. The two delegates informed consul Konstantin Bilinski 
that in case the dismemberment of the empire may have been unavoidable, the tosk Albanians 
were ready to ask for the protectorate of Austria-Hungary. This intention was shared by some 
Bektashi leader as well.
33
 It was the Bosnian Muslim policy of the Monarchy that served as an 
attractive example for the majority of the Albanians. 
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 The Muslim nobles and Catholic intellectuals, assembled in port Durrës, tried to seek a 
way out for their country. They held negotiations with the local deputy consul of Austria-
Hungary. The Albanians wanted to know whether the Monarchy was ready to intervene and to 
occupy Albania in case the Serbian army reached the seashore. On the 12th November 1912 
they adressed a letter, drafted mostly by Nikollë Kaçorri and Abdi Bej Toptani, to Emperor 
and King Franz Josef. In this letter the signatories asked the Austro-Hungarian Emperor to 
support them to create a united autonomous vilaet (from the vilaets of Shkodra, Kosovo, 
Monastir and Ioannina) within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. If it had not been 
possible, the emperor shall help the Albanians to establish an independent state from the 
above-mentioned vilaets. The signatories imagined this new state as neutral as Belgium or 
Switzerland.
34
 It is intriguing, that in the shade of the Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek 
occupations, the different political pressure groups of the Albanians imagined their future 
basically by creating an autonomous vilaet in the Ottoman Empire. The concept of 
independence was acceptable for them only in case of a totally military defeat, as a last resort.  
 It is however important to stress, that the majority of the local Muslim civilians, who 
refused to deal with everyday policy until the war, considered the activity of the opposition 
nobles and intellectuals as high treason. The Muslims opposed the plan of a national 
assembly, because in their opinion it endangered the power of the Sultan. While holding their 
demonstration, they demanded from the mutasarrif of Durrës (mayor) to expel the delegates 
from the city.
35
 
 
Throughout 1912 Ismail Qemal Bej Vlora, former leader of the ’majority wing’ of the Young 
Turks, was permanently on the road. As the Albanian uprising of Kosovo broke out, he 
appeared in Cetinje to hold negotiations about the political future of Albania with King Nikita 
and later with Isa Boletini. He was however not able to intervene directly in the event of the 
uprising.
36
   
 In September he was staying in Istambul again, as the new grand visier, Kiamil Pasha 
asked him to be a minister in his government. Qemali refused to accept the request.
37
 His 
refusal was by no means accidental: Qemali, who was an experienced politician, did not want 
to take part in the political life of the Ottoman Empire.  
 As the Balkan war broke out, Qemali travelled with his loyal secretary, Luigj 
Gurakuqi to Bukarest to visit one of the greatest Albanian colony of the peninsula. Based on 
his own initiative a conference was convoked in the Hotel Continental with the purpose to 
discuss the future of the Albanians. It needs to be remarked, that Qemali Bej saw the solution 
of the problems of his country at that time, besides the acknowledgement of the Albanian 
nation and national culture, in the establishment of an Albanian autonomy within the 
framework of the Ottoman Empire as well.
38
 
 The local delegates of the Bukarest’s colony were not able to agree on what they 
should prefer: autonomy or independence. The only conclusions they drew were that the 
dismemberment of the Albanian territories must be prevented and a national assembly needs 
to be convoked in Albania. They planned to write a letter to the great powers in which they 
intended to ask them to support the Albanian autonomy in the Ottoman Empire. The assembly 
of Bukarest ended their negotiations with the following decree on the 5. November 1912: 
„Since the Ottoman government is unable to run the state administration, the Albanians are 
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forced to gather all their strength and found a leading organisation, that take the country 
government [sic!] into its hands, and devote all its efforts to avoid that the Albanians be 
defeated and underprivileged by the Balkanian nations.”39 
 Ismail Qemal Vlora wanted to play a significant role in the future of Albania, therefore 
he instructed his adherents in South- and Middle-Albania to hinder the endeavours of Syrja 
Bej. Besides these instructions he began to convoke his own national assembly, which 
increased the general chaos in his homeland even further.
40
 
 While Luigj Gurakuqi and some delegates of Bukarest were travelling to Trieste, 
Ismal Qemali arrived in Vienne via Budapest. He visited Leopold Berchtold, the joint minister 
of foreign affairs and the Ballhausplatz officials in charge of the Albanian issues. The Bej 
informed the Austro-Hungarian diplomats about the Bukarest’s events and announced his plan 
for convoking a national assembly. According to the national historiography of Albania, by 
that very moment, Qemali had already made his decision, and worked towards 
independence.
41
 This statement however could not be confirmed unambiguously based on 
Austro-Hungarian sources. Minister Berchtold gave account in his memoirs only of what 
Qemali had asked for in Vienna: support and information. According to the memoirs the 
Albanian politician wanted to know how Austria-Hungary imagine the would-be state 
organisation of an autonomous Albania, how the Ballhausplatz would react to the idea of a 
national assembly and to a letter, written by the assembly and sent to the great powers. The 
leader of the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic corps assured Qemali Bej of his support, but at the 
same time he refused to go into great details with regard to the war events.
42
 As a matter of 
fact the unwilling readiness of Berchtold to hold negotiations with Qemali was posed not by 
the unknown future of the war. On one hand the Ballhausplatz had supported the Albanian 
national assembly organised by Syrja Vlora. On the other hand the person of Qemali counted 
as unreliable for Berchtold.
43
  
 It is hard to decide, whether Ismail Qemal Vlora had made his decision regarding the 
question of independence before his negotiations in Vienna. It is imaginable, that hearing the 
war news before 12th November he more and more tended to understand: an idea of an 
autonomous Albania within the imperial framework was only an illusion. It is however 
undeniable, that after his negotiations in Vienna, he was fully intent on proclaiming the 
independence of his country.
44
 
 Qemali and his adherents went on shore undisturbed in the port of Durrës on the 20th 
November 1912. The Ottoman city administration was run by the Albanian mutesariff 
Mahmut Mahir Efendi. It was Hamdi Bej Toptani, a significant landlord of the region and 
leader of the local gendarmerie, who was responsible for the maintenance of public order and 
who refused to prevent the landing of Qemali.
45
  
 The Ottoman Empire had practically lost his face in the city and Middle-Albania – and 
it strengthened the intentions of Qemali. The last believer of the autonomy idea in the country 
came to understand the illusory nature of their hopes as well. In the last free cities of Middle-
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Albania – Elbasan, Tirana, Lushnja, Durrës – the local councils, in the shape of the invading 
Serbian forces, were ready to proclaim the independence.
46
 
 The Albanians arriving from Triest spent some days in Durrës. They held negotiations 
with the local city council and the nobles and refugees gathered from Middle-Albania and the 
Middle-Balkan. As Qemali came to know that his greatest political rival, Syrja Vlora had 
travelled to Istambul, he began his jorney to Vlora. Durrës was occupied by the Serbian troops 
the next day, on the 25th November 1912. On the same day the nobles of Elbasan proclaimed 
the independence. Their example was followed by the city councils of Durrës, Tirana, Kavaja 
and Lushnja on the 27th November 1912.
47
 These acts, however, were left unechoed. 
 The group of men that wanted to reach Vlora marched forward under very adverse 
conditions.
48
 On their way to the south they were forced to interrupt the march for a day, 
because Kara Said Pasha, the Turkish commander of the Vardar army, whose last troops had 
retreated into Albania (between Lushnja and Berat), wanted to arrest all the men in the 
marching column for high treason.
49
 Qemali and his adherents spent the night in Fier, as 
guests of the Great House Vrioni. Some members of the Great Houses of Draga, Dërralla and 
Begolli who had escaped from Kosovo and Macedonia joined the marching column in Fier. 
The number of those marching to Vlora increased by dozens of noble and intellectual refugees 
from all regions of Albania on the road – and in this manner the number of ’national assembly 
delegates’ increased as well.   
 The groups of Qemali arrived in Vlora on the 27th November 1912. Vlora was the last 
free city in Albania. The delegates and refugees held a short meeting on the same day. After 
the local consuls of the Adriatic powers confirmed, that both Austria-Hungary and Italy were 
interested in an independent Albania,
50
 the gathered decided the proclamation shall take place 
the next day.  
 On the 28th November 1912, at 2.00 p.m., when the majority of the Albanian-
populated administrative units had been occupied by the Balkan Alliance, and in the presence 
of the delegates from Middle- and South-Albania, took place the most important moment of 
the 20th century Albanian history. Ismail Qemal Vlora held a short speech in the house of his 
relative Xhemal Bej Vlora, in which he told about the warplans of the Balkan Alliance and the 
helplessness of the Ottoman Empire. He declared that there had been only one way out for the 
Albanians: Albania must secede from the empire. A provisional government must be formed 
with the aim to represent the whole nation abroad.
51
 He then stepped out to the balcony and 
proclaimed: „From today on, under the rule of a provisional government, Albania is free and 
independent!”52 
 Qemali informed the great powers, the Balkan states and the local Turkish 
commanders of the army about the act of proclamation on the same day.
53
 In a different letter 
of his, addressed to the commander of the invasion armies of Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, 
he also touched upon an additional important intention of his. According to Qemali, Albania 
was a neutral state, that wanted to live in peace with his neighbouring countries. It followed 
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from the foregoing that he, as the leader of the new state, shall protest against all military 
operations of the Balkan Alliance in every possible manner.
54
  
 After proclaiming the independence a national assembly was formed from the 
delegates, and Ismail Qemal Vlora became entrusted on the 3rd of December 1912 to be the 
first Prime Minister of Albania.  
 
To evaluate and interpret the significance of the events on the 28th November 1912 it is 
important to analyse the list of the proclaimers. However, the list of names is not easy to 
reconstruct. It is an additional problem, that according to the Albanian national historiography 
the actors of the proclamation day were the elected representatives of the whole Albania. 
Based on the Austro-Hungarian sources it is undeniable that the majority of them were 
present not as elected representatives but as refugees. Due to the war conditions one part of 
the independence supporting votes were provided via telegrams, and it tangled the situation 
even further. It is simply not clear who and by what right gave his vote.
55
 The Albanian 
historiography had cut the ’Gordian knot’ by giving the following answer: the number of the 
proclaimers increased to 63 men by 3rd December 1912 – even though some of them had 
voted only orally (like Isa Boletini). 
 Since the precise list of the proclaimers so far could not be reconstructed, the analysis 
of its composition can be carried out only based on estimations.
56
 The number of the 
proclaimers must have ranged from 40 to 43 person – the number 37 given by the Albanian 
historiography seems to be too few. According to their territorial origins, North-Albania 
(Shkodra) was represented by one person, Middle-Albania (Durrës, Tirana, Kruja, Shijak, 
Elbasan, Berat) by approximately 15, South-Albania (Fier, Lushnja, Vlora, Korça, 
Gjirokastra, Tepelena, Përmet) by about 15 as well, while from Kosovo and Macedonia 
delegated roughly 10 persons. It means the tosk Albanians were overrepresented.  
 Based on the investigated lists the proclaimers were mostly composed by the 10-12 
members of the Great Houses (Vlora, Vrioni, Toptani, Kalkandelen, Përmeti) and of those 15 
representatives who arrived from the colonies. It means that one-third of the voters were 
intellectuals and one-fourth were landowners.  
 According to the names the confessional division was the following: approximately 
two-third of the voters were Muslims, and one-third were Ortodoxes. The Catholics were 
represented only by two men. 
 No doubt, that the national assembly of Vlora simply did not represent the opinion of 
the majority of the Albanian population. The identity of that majority was deeply rooted in 
that one of the Ottoman Empire. The vast majority of the proclaimers may have voted for the 
independence under the intermediate pressure of the war events and may have been forced by 
desperate necessity! Based on these arguments the proclamation, contrary to the belief of the 
Albanian national historiography, can not be regarded „as the result of the natural endeavours 
of the Albanian nation”.57 
  Ismail Qemali Vlora proclaimed the independence basically with the assistance of 
certain members of the Great Houses
58
 and with the help of the colonial intellectuals.
59
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III. Albania and the Ottoman Empire 
 
On hearing the news about the independence proclamation in Vlora, the leaders of the empire 
reacted with refusal. The government of Istambul acknowledged neither the secession nor the 
independent status of Albania. What is more, it refused to accept the idea of a vassal Albanian 
state within the imperial framework.
60
 That reaction is fully agreeable, because the 
independence was proclaimed at the very moment when tens of thousands of Albanian and 
Turkish soldiers where fighting against the allied forces in Ioannina and Shkodra. From the 
point of view of Istambul, the initiative of Vlora was absolutely illegal, because there had 
been a state and a functioning state administration in the Balkans.  
 The news about the proclamation events of 28th November 1912 reached the Ottoman 
commanders only in the early days of December. Esat Halasti Pasha, fighting a battle against 
the Greek divisions in Ioannina probably ordered the arrest and the carrying off of Ismail 
Qemali Vlora. But after a while he changed his intention, accepting the opinion of Myfit Bej 
Libohova and the kadi of Ioannina. The two Albanian nobles argued, that the commander 
would have risked the loyalty of the rest of Albanian batallions with the arrest. Esat Halasti 
sent telegrams to the last functioning administrative units and ordered the officials to 
cooperate with the government of Qemali.
61
 The commander of Ioannina, presumably on his 
own initiatives, granted Qemali Bej permission to organise the administration of the 
autonomous Albania with the restriction that the independence, inspired by Austria-Hungary 
and Italy remains unacceptable.
62
 
 The grand visier was informed about the proclamation by Ismail Qemali Vlora only on 
3rd December 1912. The Albanian Prime minister announced in his telegram, that a 
provisonal government had been formed by the delegates of the nation. According to Qemali 
the  new state would maintain the tight connections with the Caliph. „The Albanians – wrote 
the Premier – want to live free in their own territory and they are determined to reach the 
status the Macedonian vilaets had aspired to [sic!].” Qemali carefully avoided using the word 
”independence” in his telegram.63  
 The answer telegram of the grand visier arrived in Vlora on 9th December. Kiamil 
Pasha expressed his astonishment hearing the news from Albania. According to him, the act 
of the proclamation was nothing less than a revolt against the empire. Kiamil tried to 
influence Qemali with a decree that was accepted by the Young Turk government on 23rd 
October 1912. The decree granted autonomy to whole Albania under the reign of an Ottoman 
prince. Ismail Qemali thanked for the governmental proposition but he refused to accept it. 
According to him the proposition arrived too late: independence had been proclaimed and the 
future of Albania depended on the negotiations, held by the great powers in London.
64
 
                                                                                                                                                        
499, 500-507 and Konrad CLEWING, Identitätspolitik und Loyalitäten: Von der Religion zur Nation, in: Konrad 
CLEWING / Oliver Jens SCHMITT (eds.), Geschichte Südosteuropas. Regensburg 2011, 505-515, 513. 
59
 GODIN, Aus dem neuen Albanien, 35. 
60
 Arben PUTO, Pavarësia shqiptare dhe diplomacia e fuqive të mëdha (1912–1914). Tirana 1978, 135–136. 
61
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6c, letter of Lejhanec, Valona, 03.12.1912, No.71. It was the mutasariff of 
Vlora who was instructed from Istanbul to arrest Qemali as well. ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6a, telegram 
of Rudnay, Durazzo, 26.11.1912, Nr.5908. 
62
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6c, telegram of Lejhanec, Valona, 04.12.1912, No.753. According to the 
Albanian historiography Esat Halasti warmly congratulated on the proclamation of the independence on 2nd 
December 1912. KOTINI (ed.), Qeveria e Përkohëshme, Nr.49, 54.  
63
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6c, telegrams of Lejhanec, Valona, 04.12.1912, No.753 and 06.12.1912, 
No.1187. 
64
 VLORA, Lebenserinnerungen II (1973), 26. 
 11 
On 11th of December 200 Turkish cavalry-men were sent from Ioannina to Vlora, to 
arrest Qemali Bej – the person however, who gave orders for the arrest has so far remained 
unknown. The Albanian Prime minister sent 50 men to impede the Turkish soldiers in the 
pass of Lineci.
65
 Finally no armed conflict ensued. Qemali wrote a letter to the grand visier in 
a conciliatory tone on 18th December 1912. In his writing he reiterated the main reasons of 
the proclamation: it was the only way to avoid being occupied and dismembered by the allied 
Balkan states. Istambul was also interested, added Qemali, in being allied with a friendly 
Albania against the hostile Balkan states. Besides the above mentioned facts, the 
establishment of the Albanian state was based on the national principle, agreed and 
emphasized by the Balkan Allies as well.
66
 It has remained unknown whether the grand visier 
answered to that letter. It is a fact, that after sending that letter to Istambul the Turkish 
authorities impeded the communication channels of Vlora and they contributed to the 
complete isolation of the port.
67
 
 The Ottoman Empire singned the peace treaty in London on 30th May 1913. With that 
act the Young Turk government acknowledged the right of the great powers to make 
decisions on the future of Albania.
68
  
 
In December of 1912 there were three Ottoman armies and some divisions, fighting alone, cut 
from the high command, in Middle- and South-Albania. The fortress of Ioannina, as 
mentioned above, was defended by Esat Halasti Pasha and his brother, Vehib Halasti. They 
led approximately 30-40.000 men (according to Myfit Libohova 12.000 of them had to be 
Albanians).
69
 Between the river of Shkumbi and the city of Berat were stationed the V. army-
corps and the rest of the Vardar-army.
70
 
 The V. army-corps was led by Kara Said Pasha. He retreated from Kumanovo to 
Berat. Only 12.000 men were still alive from his troops. These soldiers were disciplined, but 
they were unable to fight in battle-line. They kept good connections with the local civilian 
population. Kara Said built up a more or less sufficiently functioning military administration 
in the region, and he tolerated the presence of the officials of the Vlora government. The 
Pasha and his last troops were the reason why the Serbian divisions dared not to cross the 
Shkumbi and occupy South-Albania.
71
 
 It was 2.000 demoralised and exhausted men from Anatolia that retreated into Fier. 
They were in fully lethargy, all they wished was to return home. The Anatolians sold their 
weapons and ammunition to the civilians. Their officers were unable to restore the discipline.  
 One division of the Vardar army, which originally was responsible for defending the 
Sancak of Novipazar, led by Cavid Pasha escaped from the battle-line to Albania as well. The 
Serbian troops gave chase to that very division as they reached the cost by Durrës. Cavid 
Pasha commanded 5.000 Turkish soldiers from Anatolia. Until May of 1913, when these 
troops were transported to Istambul, they had been garnisoned in the area of Vlora and they 
had posed a  permanent threat to the government of Qemali.
72
 
                                                 
65
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6c, telegram of Lejhanec, Valona, 12.12.1912, No.2552. 
66
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6c, telegram of Lejhanec, Valona, 18.12.1912, No.4019. 
67
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/Jänner-März 1913, telegram of Rudnay, Durazzo, 27.02.1913, No.3772. 
68
 PUTO, Pavarësia shqiptare, 138 and PUTO, Historia diplomatike, 110. 
69
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 417/6c, telegram of Lejhanec, Valona, 03.12.1912, No.568. 
70
 The data about the military events and the Ottoman army stem from: KA Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät [KA 
MKSM], 18–1/7 (Kt. 1095.), 18–1/7–5 de 1913, Wien, 27.03.1913, K.Nr.2360. Beilage: Bruno THOMAS: Bericht 
über Albanien. I. Die gegenwärtigen Verhältnisse in Albanien 1913, 2. 10–14 and Johann HOFMANN: Bericht 
über Albanien 1913. 5. 8–10, 28. 
71
 ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 415/5r, telegram of Lejhanec, Valona, 07.01.1913, Nr.3848. 
72
 Djordje MIKIĆ, The Albanians and Serbia during the Balkan Wars, in: Béla K. KIRÁLY / Dimitrije DJORDJEVIĆ 
(eds.), East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars. New York 1987, 174 and Carl SAX, Nachtrag zur 
Geschichte des Machtverfalls der Türkei. Wien 1913, 642. 
 12 
 In Delvino 4-5 battalions were stationed, comprised mostly of Albanians and led by 
Mehmet Ali Delvino Pasha. The Albanian landowner retreated from Monastir to Delvino, 
where he built up military administration. The Pasha did not advocate the policy of the 
provisional government of Vlora, but he also refused to threaten it with an armed assault. 
What he intended to do was nothing less than to cover the forces of Esat Halasti and to defend 
the coast in the area of Saranda and his family estate in Delvino. 
 Under the command of Halil Bej, approximately 12.000 men were garrisoned in 
Leskovik in the last weeks of December 1912 as well.
73
 
 Ismail Qemali Vlora sent numerous calls to the Albanian soldiers of the Ottoman 
troops in the first weeks of December, in which he urged them to desert from the army. That 
activity made the Ottoman officers naturally hostile toward the government of Vlora. Under 
the influence of Qemali, thounsands of soldiers deserted taking their weapons and 
ammunition with them. Although after 20th December the Albanian Prime minister ceased his 
demoralizing propaganda activity, the military moral of the rest Albanian soldiers of the 
Ottoman army was basically destroyed in the long run.  
 The Ottoman field-officers proved to be powerless against the general desertation 
phenomenon: they tried to discipline their soldiers with martial law and amnesty – but in 
vain.
74
 There had been originally 12 of the Albanian redif-batallions in Ioannina. After 
receiving the calls of Qemali it was only two of them that refused to leave the trenches. The 
majority of the professional nizam-units, comprised of Albanians, continued fighting against 
the Greek army till the ceasefire of 3rd December 1912. (It must be stressed, that a significant 
number of the Albanian soldiers who had deserted from Ioannina appeared later in Çamëria, 
in their home country in order to fight against the irregular Greek units. It was another group 
of the deserted soldiers that assembled between Gjirokastra and Delvino. They decided to 
return under the command of Esat Halasti in January of 1913.)
75
  
 The Ottoman troops garnisoned in Middle-Albania denoted more serious threat to the 
power of Ismail Qemali than those of Ioannina. They were theoretically able to liquidate the 
new and rebellious Albanian state administration. The Ottoman field-officers in Berat were 
hostile toward Qemali, but at the same time they were fully aware of the reality: their troops 
were unable to fight and they had to survive the rest time of the war in Albania. The Turkish 
field-officers did not want to risk a military conflict with the government of Vlora.
76
 
 It was 3-4.000 armed Albanians that deserted from Berat till March of 1913. The rest 
of the Albanian officers remained under the command of Kara Said and sent several letters to 
Qemali in which they assured the Prime minister of their loyalty. They showed readiness to 
inform Qemali of all the news that would come to their knowledge.
77
 The Prime minister did 
his best to keep the Anatolian soldiers at a distance from Vlora. He attempted to persuade the 
Turkish commanders of Berat of the general capitulation. At the same time Qemali urged the 
governments of the Adriatic powers to be ready to transport the Anatolian troops from 
Albania to Istambul.
78
 
 
The Young Turk government did not accept the secession of Albania. Since the government 
of Istambul refused to negotiate with Qemali, it seemed more effective to mobilize the 
Muslim population and to elaborate new plans based on their feelings and attitudes. It was in 
January of 1913 that an idea appeared that held the best hopes for being realized. The grand 
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visier wanted to send Albanian officers and soldiers of the imperial army to Albania. He 
wanted them to organize irregular troops modelled on the Macedonian VMRO, and to spark 
off uprisings against the government of Vlora and the allied armies of the Balkan states in the 
spring.
79
 
 Probably due to the military actions of winter and early spring there was no time to 
carry out the plan outlined above. The military operations of the Greek, Montenegrin and 
Serbian armies forced the Ottoman high command to withdraw their last troops from 
Albania.
80
 But as a matter of fact not until the fall of Shkodra were the military positions of 
the empire undermined in the West-Balkan.  
 It was the very moment of the outbreak of the Second Balkan War that the Young 
Turk government had a gleam of hope to carry out the Albanian plans. Dozens of officers 
travelled from Istambul to Albanian territories,
81
 of whom the most well-known was Arif 
Hikmet. It must be stressed that these officers were able to began their work with the 
assistance of Serbia. The influence their activity exercised on the Albanian events of 1913 
however, was not significant.  
 
The creation of Qemali’s Albania put the Albanians, who were on duty either as state officials 
or as military officers, in an awkward position. The proclamation of independence exposed, 
for instance, the Albanians dwelling in Anatolia and Syria to serious incidents. The Albanian 
citizens of vilaets Aydin and Syria were regularly pestered by the local authorities and the 
Turkish population during 1913.
82
 It was the local consulates of Austria-Hungary and Italy 
that protested against the witnessed and proved atrocoties (arrests and expels) and mayhems.
83
 
From the point of view of the international law and treaties none of the great powers had the 
right to have their say in the inner policy of Istambul. Despite this fact they were able to 
influence the Turkish authorities because it was the navies of the Adriatic powers that 
transported the Anatolian soldiers home from Albania.
84
 
 In the first days of December the Albanians living in Istambul refused to take the fact 
seriously that the independence of Albania had been proclaimed. They considered the act as 
an adventurous political step of Ismail Qemali Vlora on his own initiative. In their opinion the 
Albanian independence should have been proclaimed only in two cases: when the 
proclamation would have been forced by a succesful general uprising or in case the majority 
of the Albanians would have wanted to be seceded from the Empire.
85
 After several days 
however, having rethought the unbelievable alterations of the year 1912, Halil Gjirokastra 
Pasha, chairman of the Albanian national club in the capital, turned directly to Count János 
Pallavicini, the ambassador of Austria-Hungary, and asked him whether the proclamation had 
been inspired or motivated by the Adriatic powers. In case of a confirmatory answer the 
Albanian club would request advice how to cope with the changed situation. According to 
Halil the Albanians of Istambul had advocated the idea of the autonomy but now they showed 
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readiness to accept the independece in case Austria-Hungary would play the role of a 
protector over Albania.
86
 
 The Young Turk government and the reactions from the press however forced the 
leadership of the national club to reconsider its views. Being afraid of the authorities and 
security forces Halil Pasha reverted to his former point of view and he was fully intent on 
proving his loyalty to the Empire. He suggested in April 1913 that Albania, remaining under 
the suzerenity of the Sultan, be ruled by a prince from the Ottoman dinasty. This idea was 
elaborated on by the leadership of the club and was sent both to the Young Turk government 
and to the participiants of the conference in London as a memorandum.
87
  
 
We are far from being well-informed as to what alterations were exactly caused by the 
independence proclamation in the everyday life of those Albanians being on duty as public 
officials or officers of the Empire in Anatolia or Asia.  
 One of the most intriguing life was undoubtedly led by Ahmet Izzet Pasha, born in 
Ohrid (1867–1937).88 Izzet Pasha belonged to those high commanders whose loyalty was 
basically connected to their imperial consciousness. (To put it differently they refused to 
accept the modern national ideas of being an Albanian or a Turkish.) According to the 
memoirs of Izzet he had opposed the violent policy of Mahmut Şevket Pasha from 1910 
onwards, so he deemed the Albanian uprisings of 1910-1912 against the Young Turk 
government as righteous.
89
 As a consuequence of the independence proclamation, due to his 
Albanian origin, he was considered as a suspicious person in the Istambul political circles and 
he was isolated. Since he was loyal to the Empire he went to Jemen as a volunteer to fight 
against local rebels in the spring of 1913
90
 and refused to influence the Albanian-Turkish 
relations. Due to his origin, rank and his personal prestige Izzet became a suitable pretender of 
the youngturk government for the Albanian throne later. His coup d’état however proved to be 
a failure in January of 1914.
91
 Izzet Pasha fought as a high commander of the Ottoman and 
Turkish Armies during the First World War and in the regional war with Greece after 1918. In 
the interwar period he lived and died in Anatolia.  
 The reaction of Ressul Bej from Gjirokastra (?-?), the Ottoman general consul in 
Sarajevo, was significantly different from that of Izzet Pasha. The general consul was in duty 
for decades. The archival sources of Vienna strongly suggest that he always sympathised with 
the Albanian national movement, but at the same time his sympathy did not prevent him from 
earning his living as a state official.
92
 The proclamation of independence forced him to take a 
decision, because his Albanian origin made his position uncertain in the diplomatic corps of 
the Empire. From the very beginning of the First Balkan War he regularly visited the Austro-
Hungarian officials in Sarajevo in order to discuss with them „the Albanian case”. During 
these discussions it turned out that Ressul Bej was an enthusiastic believer of an independent 
Albania, led by a dinasty from Europe and being under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary. It 
must be stressed however, that in case the Empire had proved to be able to protect his 
territorial integrity, the general consul would absolutely have been ready to continue his 
career in the Ottoman diplomatic corps.
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The connections between the independent Albania and the disintegrating Ottoman Empire 
were considerably muddled and unclarified in 1913. A significant number of the Albanian 
politicians had desired and chased the independence since the outbreak of the First Balkan 
War, while the majority of the Muslim population had got a positive attitude to the empire. 
The Ottoman state administration did not yet collapse totally in the territory of Albania until 
June of 1913, on the contrary, it was run by the imperial officials parallel with the new 
Albanian state administration, built up by the provisional government of Vlora. Both the 
banners of Albania and the empire waved over the settlements. The last imperial troops were 
still present and the religious symbols of the empire and the Caliph could have been seen on 
the rooftops or walls of private houses as well.
94
 The majority of the civil population refused 
to take the independence proclamation seriously. What is more, they were not aware in 
general what had been going on the Balkan-peninsula. The Muslim population of the 
independent Albania first faced with the consequences of the secession from the empire only 
in the autumn of 1913 and it was partly due to this recognition that the delayed peasant 
uprising of Middle-Albania broke out in May of 1914. 
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